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ANDY ROONEY GETS THE LAUGH, BUT
RUBS RAIN-X THE WRONG WAY
I. INTRODUCTION
Andy Rooney is well-known as the resident curmudgeon on 60 Min-
utes. Once a week he takes the pulse of the nation and reacts to it with
all the certainty and credibility of a street smart Captain Kangaroo. One
Sunday night he was feeling particularly cantankerous, scratching his
head and pontificating on why he receives so many unsolicited presents
from viewers. As he sat there looking the gift horses in their collective
mouth, he let it be known that he had received a bottle of a windshield
coating called Rain-X in the mail, and that it "didn't work."' This
prompted yet another gift: a sixteen million dollar defamation lawsuit.2
Courts deciding defamation claims have been struggling with the
policy conflict between the first amendment right to free speech, which
encourages public debate, and the right to proper redress for harm in-
flicted upon one's reputation.' Until recently, the lower courts consid-
ered opinion a constitutionally protected right.4 Plaintiffs bringing
defamation actions could not recover if the court ruled that the defend-
ants' statements constituted opinion.5
In Unelko Corp. v. Rooney6 ("Rooney"), the District Court of Ari-
zona held that Andy Rooney's statement was opinion and that he was
therefore constitutionally protected from suit.7 While the case was on
appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the United States Supreme
Court decided Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.' ("Milkovich"), holding
that statements of opinion are not necessarily immune from defamation
suits.9 However, Andy Rooney again avoided liability for his remarks on
60 Minutes regarding the plaintiff's product.' ° The circuit court held
that although the statement was not a protected expression of opinion,
Unelko did not show that the statement was false. " Thus, the court
1. Unelko Corp. v. Rooney, 912 F.2d 1049, 1051 (9th Cir. 1990).
2. See infra note 21.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 186-97.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 77-87.
5. Id.
6. 912 F.2d 1049 (9th Cir. 1990).
7. Id. at 1052.
8. 110 S. Ct. 2695 (1990).
9. Id. at 2705.
10. Rooney, 912 F.2d at 1050.
11. Id. at 1057.
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affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the case. 12
Rooney provided the Ninth Circuit with its first opportunity to ap-
ply the Supreme Court's holding in Milkovich. 3 This note explores the
common law background to the Milkovich decision. It then examines
how the Rooney court set dangerous precedent by misapplying the
Milkovich test and making decisions which should have been remanded
to the trial court in light of the intervening change in law.
II. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In October of 1987, Andy Rooney wrote a column entitled "RAIN"
which was published in the Arizona Republic.'4 He bemoaned his
problems with rain and complained that cars should have "truck-sized
windshield wipers" to better clean the entire windshield. 5 Unelko's na-
tional sales manager sent Rooney a small supply of Unelko's Rain-X
product.' 6 He included a letter, stating, "Andy, you don't need those
truck-sized windshield wipers - all you need is RAIN-X - 'The Invisi-
ble Windshield Wiper.' The one-step, wipe-on automotive glass coating
that repels rain, sleet and snow on contact and takes up where windshield
wipers leave off!"'
7
On the April 17, 1988 broadcast of 60 Minutes, 8 Rooney did a seg-
12. Id.
13. Appellants' Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En banc at 2,
Rooney, 912 F.2d 1049 (No. CA 89-15751).
14. Unelko Corp. v. Rooney, 912 F.2d 1049, 1050 (9th Cir. 1990).
15. Id. Rooney's column asserted, "I wish they'd make truck-sized windshield wipers for
cars that went straight back and forth across the windshield instead of wiping in that half-
moon shape. I imagine they'll get to that because the half-moon shape leaves too much of the
windshield unwiped." Appellants' Opening Brief at 4, Rooney, 912 F.2d 1049 (No. CV 89-
15751).
16. Rooney, 912 F.2d at 1050. Rain-X is described by plaintiffs as "a patented and trade-
marked transparent polymer coating for windshields and windows that repels rain, sleet and
snow by causing it to bead-up and roll off treated glass surfaces instead of filming or flooding
the surface and obscuring visibility." Appellants' Opening Brief at 4, Rooney, 912 F.2d 1049
(No. CV 89-15751).
17. Rooney, 912 F.2d at 1050. The letter continued as follows:
Our President, Howard Ohlhausen, inventor of Rain-X (among other chemical prod-
ucts) first realized the same drawbacks that you referred to in your article as a navi-
gator in the United States Air Force. With these windshield wiper inadequacies in
mind, Mr. Ohlhausen invented Rain-X and received a chemical patent in 1972.
Enclosed please find literature outlining the many benefits, applications and proper-
ties of this unique material.
In order that you may personally test and evaluate Rain-X performance, we have
forwarded a small supply to you today via U.P.S.
We trust that Rain-X will increase your affection for rainy days, while increasing
your driving safety, comfort and visibility.
Id. at 1050-51.
18. 60 Minutes is a popular weekly television news show on CBS.
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ment devoted to the junk mail that he had been receiving.' 9 At one
point, Rooney stated:
Here's something for the windshield of your car called
Rain-X. The fellow who makes this sent me a whole case of it.
He's very proud of it. I actually spent an hour one Saturday
putting it on the windshield of my car. I suppose he'd like a
commercial or a testimonial. You know how they hold the
product up like this? It didn't work.2"
19. Rooney, 912 F.2d at 1051. "Rooney, from a prepared, edited, recorded, and approved
script, identified Rain-X by name while the camera zoomed in on the bottle .... Appellants'
Opening Brief at 6, Rooney, 912 F.2d 1049 (No. CV 89-15751) (citation omitted).
The text of the segment in full is as follows:
MIKE WALLACE: You think you get junk mail? How would you like to be
Andy Rooney? Or, even worse, how would you like to be Andy Rooney's mailman?
ANDY ROONEY: People send me things. I get an awful lot of junk that I
don't want that just seems too interesting to throw away. Some people send me stuff
because they're friendly. Others, of course, send it because they're looking for a plug
on the air.
I get a lot of caps, and a lot of cups. This is a cup from the ship Guam that I
spent some time on off Beirut. Captain Quarterman sent me this; I like it. This is a
musical cup. I don't like that much.
I get a lot of music sent me. People send me songs they've written on tape,
which I don't listen to. This is a piece of sheet music. It's from a prisoner in Florida,
and the song is called 'Lady Liberty, Oh How I Love Thee.' He's in prison for
murder, so he's going to be there a long time without liberty.
Hamilton Watch sent me this expensive watch. It's not really proper for me to
keep something like this, and I should send it back.
I get pictures of myself. Here's a picture of me at a party with John Chancellor.
You probably didn't know I traveled in those circles.
Here's the sort of thing I get a lot of. I don't know why they sent me this. It's a
piece of a door. I guess they were pushing some new kind of material.
Here's something for the windshield of your car called Rain-X. The fellow who
makes this sent me a whole case of it. He's very proud of it. I actually spent an hour
one Saturday putting it on the windshield of my car. I suppose he'd like a commer-
cial or a testimonial. You know how they hold the product up like this? It didn't
work.
And then I get books. Holy mackerel, do I get books. Mostly from publishers,
but I get a lot from authors, too. They send me their manuscripts. They want me to
read them.
Look at this. Several people have sent me this over the years. The illustrator
ripped off a picture of me. I suppose I could have sued him, but I was busy that day.
This is the most repulsive thing anyone sent me. It's from some anti-cigarette
group. It's an ashtray in the shape of a human lung.
Someone suggested I could neaten up my office with these giant paper clips.
Sort of a good idea.
This is one of the best things I ever got. It's an orange peeler. It's changed my
life. Simple enough, made by some company in Tulon, Illinois. I have an orange
almost every morning of my life, and I love peeling it this way. It really is magic.
You can amaze your friends with this. Look at that. There. Presto!
People are very nice. But would you do me two little favors? One, don't send
me anything more. And two, don't ask me to send any of this to you.
Rooney, 912 F.2d at 1051.
20. Rooney, 912 F.2d at 1051. Plaintiffs assert that they sent Rooney the product litera-
ture in care of the Chicago Tribune, which syndicated the column, along with a small supply of
1991]
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In May of 1988, Unelko sued Rooney and CBS for defamation,
product disparagement, and tortious interference with business relation-
ships.2' Four days later, Rooney made more comments regarding Rain-
X on 60 Minutes, including references to the letters he had received
praising the product. 22 One letter stated: "If I were Rain-X, I'd sue
you."23 Rooney attempted to revise his position to a more subjective
stance by stating: "Well, I said I tried it and it didn't work for me ....
Was I only expected to comment on it if I loved it? What if he'd sent me
two tickets to a movie he'd made, and I didn't like the plot? He must
Rain-X for his "'personal' test, evaluation, and benefit and not in care of CBS or '60 Minutes'
for a 'plug on the air,' 'commercial' or 'testimonial' broadcast before a prime time audience of
millions of viewers." Appellants' Opening Brief at 5, Rooney, 912 F.2d 1049 (No. CV 89-
15751).
21. Rooney, 912 F.2d at 1051. The suit for $16 million was filed on behalf of Unelko, the
Scottsdale firm that sells Rain-X, and the product's inventor, Howard Ohlhausen. Id. at 1052.
They alleged that Rooney and CBS caused substantial damage to their reputation and busi-
ness, by "maliciously broadcast[ing] false and defamatory statements about [Rain-X]." Appel-
lants' Opening Brief at 3, Rooney, 912 F.2d 1049 (No. CV 89-15751).
CBS had Mike Wallace read on the air a letter from race-car driver Mario Andretti which
praised Rain-X. However, Wallace also remarked that Andretti is a spokesperson for Unelko.
L.A. Times, May 9, 1988, § 6 (Calendar) at 2, col. 1.
22. See infra note 23.
23. Other letters to 60 Minutes included David Frier's which asserted:
Well, once again you have maligned the innocent in your ever-widening search for
the angle behind everything.
I have used Rain-X ever since it was first shown to me by another user of it, a
fellow who is a sports rally driver by hobby. I have used it constantly since that day
in 1978. Let me assure Andy Rooney and all of you: It works.
[O]nce it is applied, it performs absolutely everything its manufacturer
claims for it....
Perhaps in the future you could have someone more unbiased test a product
before maligning it on the air... , [Rain-X's] reputation should be vindicated with
an on-air retraction ....
Appellants' Opening Brief at 9, Rooney, 912 F.2d 1049 (No. CV 89-15751).
Another letter to 60 Minutes from viewer Robert DeLay stated as follows:
For the perverse pleasure of a little sensational, show business silliness, you have
publicly discredited a remarkable and important product. I have absolutely no inter-
est in the company that manufactures Rain-X. Nor do I sell it. But I do use it
regularly and, not only does it work, I consider it one of the three or four most
significant new products to come on the market in years. And certainly for automo-
bile owners. I wouldn't hesitate to say that this product works miraculously, so I
wonder if you really tried it [at] all before you thoughtlessly hurt the company, their
employees and their product.
... I find it especially appalling that you senselessly embarass [sic] a legitimate
product that not only works exactly as advertised but - I believe - could save
many lives because of vastly increased visibility in bad weather.
Id. at 9-10.
Although Rooney only received letters praising Rain-X, Unelko had received some letters
in the past which complained that "[Y]our product simply doesn't work"; "I found the prod-




know I don't do commercials." '24 Unelko thereafter amended its com-
plaint, adding claims for relief based on the second broadcast, alleging
that the broadcast was devised to further ridicule Rain-X, and that it
contained more false statements of fact.25
Rooney prevailed on a motion for summary judgment.26 Relying on
a significant body of Ninth Circuit case law,27 the district court ruled
that Rooney's statement that Rain-X "didn't work" was an opinion
which was therefore constitutionally protected.28 Unelko appealed to the
24. Rooney, 912 F.2d at 1051. The text of the follow-up segment in full is as follows:
BRADLEY: You want to talk money? Big money? Talk to Andy Rooney.
ANDY ROONEY: Tonight I feel like a rich man. Along with CBS, I'm being
sued for $16 million. I hope they take American Express. You may recall that three
weeks ago I talked about things people have sent me. One of the items was this
product, called Rain-X, made by the Unelko Corporation of Scottsdale, Arizona.
The tag on this three and a half ounce bottle says that it lists for $6.59, sells for $3.70.
'Dramatically improves wet weather visibility, even without wipers. Repels
rain, sleet and snow. Makes frost, bugs, mud and grime easy to remove.'
Well, I said I tried it and it didn't work for me. No matter what you say on '60
Minutes,' you get a reaction. The clock was still ticking when I got a call from a
fellow at a local boatyard in our town, saying he'd come right over and show me how
to use Rain-X.
Then we got letters saying it was a good product. David Frier of Silver Spring,
Maryland, says, 'Granted, the product is not easy to apply correctly, but once it is
applied, it performs absolutely everything its manufacturer claims for it.' John Wad-
sworth of Greensburg, Pennsylvania, says it works 'if you use just water and not
window cleaner in your windshield sprayer.' Robert Delay of Ettawa, Tennessee,
says, 'If I were Rain-X, I'd sue you.' June Willis of Houston says, 'I think you owe
the inventor, Howard Ohlhausen, an apology.' Well, I'll tell you, June, he'd have a
lot easier time getting an apology out of me than $16 million. Jim Mills, Automotive
News western sales manager, says, 'Your comments about Rain-X were very unfair.'
Several letters said that Rain-X works best when you're going fast, and maybe
that was my trouble. I called American Airlines trying to find out what they think of
Rain-X, and I called several automobile manufacturers, to see what they say about it,
but I didn't get any help here because they don't use it, and I haven't been able to
find out what Rain-X is made of.
So that's my problem tonight, friends. This fellow sent me this product to eval-
uate, and I did. Was I only expected to comment on it if I loved it? What if he'd sent
me two tickets to a movie he'd made, and I didn't like the plot? He must know I
don't do commercials. But, in spite of all that, to tell you the truth, I feel sort of bad
about the whole thing. Please don't send money unless I ask for it.
Id. at 1051-52.
25. Appellants' Opening Brief at 15, Rooney, 912 F.2d 1049 (No. CV 89-15751). Unelko
also increased its demand to $22 million. Appellees' Answering Brief at 3, Rooney, 912 F.2d
1049 (No. CV 89-15751).
26. Rooney, 912 F.2d at 1052.
27. The district court relied on Ault v. Hustler Magazine, 860 F.2d 877, 880 (9th Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1532 (1989) (an action does not lie under the first amendment
where a challenged statement is one of opinion rather than fact) and Lewis v. Time, Inc., 710
F.2d 549, 553 (9th Cir. 1983) ("[A]n opinion is simply not actionable defamation.") Rooney,
912 F.2d at 1052-53.
28. To justify his conclusion that Rooney's statement could only be viewed by the audi-
ence as opinion, the trial judge stated:
[I]t can hardly be disputed that those who turn in to watch Andy Rooney on '60
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Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,2 9 but while the case was under appeal,
the United States Supreme Court decided that commentary is privileged
only if it is distinctly presented as an opinion - not as objective fact.a°
III. BACKGROUND: THE FACT V. OPINION DISTINCTION
AND ITS DEMISE
A. Common Law Development of Defamation Law
A constitutional privilege based on the first amendment has pro-
vided protection of differing extents to the media from defamation suits.
Prior to New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 31 ("Sullivan"), however, no
constitutional privilege was recognized, and the common law imposed
strict liability in libel suits without regard to fault.32 Statements of opin-
ion were actionable in defamation suits if "the expression was sufficiently
derogatory of another as to cause harm to his reputation, so as to lower
him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from
associating or dealing with him."33 Thus, there was a great deal of self-
censorship in regard to conjectural material, because of the increased
danger of liability and expensive litigation. As the Supreme Court noted
in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,34 "allowing the media to avoid liability
Minutes' understand that his comments and statements are humorous, satirical, full
of ridicule and often to be taken with a grain of salt. His audience realizes that what
they get from Rooney is not a factual summation of the news but rather Rooney's
opinions on a variety of subjects. Thus, they are less likely to take his comments
seriously or as the absolute truth than they would statements from a newspaper or
news program whose purpose is to report factual news stories. As a result, the facts
surrounding the publication of Rooney's statements support a finding that, rather
than constituting statements of fact in the defamatory sense, Rooney's comments
evolved from his own opinion of the product and were understood by the audience as
such.
Appellants' Opening Brief at 10, Rooney, 912 F.2d 1049 (No. CV 89-15751) (quoting Order at
18-19 (excerpt of Record at 34-35)).
The trial judge also stated that "whether Rain-X works is a subjective determination ca-
pable of producing divergent opinions among those who try it. Id. at 10-11 (quoting Order at
23 (excerpt of Record at 39)).
29. Rooney, 912 F.2d at 1050.
30. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695 (1990).
31. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
32. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2703 (1990).
[T~he common law position was to impose liability despite the lack of intent, reck-
lessness or negligence on the part of the defendant .... In other words, the common
law was to the effect that if the defendant was at fault in publishing the statement to a
third party and it was reasonably understood to defame the other he was subject to
liability. This amounted to the imposition of strict liability, or 'liability without fault'
with regard to the falsity and the defamatory character of the statement.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 580B comment b (1977).
33. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2703 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 566
comment a (1977)).
34. 418 U.S. 767 (1986).
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only by proving the truth of all injurious statements does not accord ade-
quate protection to First Amendment liberties.""
B. The Privilege of Fair Comment
The privilege of fair comment emerged in response to the burden-
some defamation laws which stifled public debate.36 The burden was on
a media defendant to present a defense by proving the truth of the state-
ment. "The principle of 'fair comment' afford[ed] legal immunity for the
honest expression of opinion on matters of legitimate public interest
when based upon a true or privileged statement of fact."37 The majority
rule applied the privilege of fair comment only to an expression of opin-
ion." In the case of an opinion, liability was avoided only by showing
that the statement was based upon true facts which justified the opinion.
The privilege did not apply to a false statement of fact, even one implied
from an expression of opinion. a9 The theory of the privilege was balanc-
ing the need for public debate against the need to provide remedies to
citizens injured by irresponsible speech.' However, this common law
principle was restrictive, since the opinion or comment had to be fully
justified by true facts, and it has since been displaced by constitutional
principle.41
C. New York Times v. Sullivan and Its Progeny
In Sullivan, the Court relaxed the strict liability standard.42 Based
on the first amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and press, the
Court imposed constitutional limitations upon state libel laws.43 Unless
the plaintiff could prove actual malice, the constitutional privilege pro-
vided a defense to claims arising out of false statements about public offi-
cials conveyed to the public via the media.' Actual malice was defined
as publication with actual knowledge of falsity or with reckless disregard
of probable falsity.45
35. Id. at 340.
36. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2703 (1990).
37. Id. (quoting I F. HARPER & F. JAMES, LAW OF TORTS § 5.28 at 456 (1956) (footnote
omitted)).
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 comment a (1977).
39. Id.
40. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2703.
41. Note, Fact and Opinion in Defamation: Recognizing the Formative Power of Context,
58 FORDHAM L. REV. 761, 765 (1990).
42. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
43. Id. at 283.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 280.
1991]
LOYOLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL
Sullivan was the United States Supreme Court's first decision defin-
ing constitutional protection of speech and the press from a state libel
action brought by a public official." Sullivan was an elected Commis-
sioner in Alabama." On March 29, 1960, the New York Times carried a
full page advertisement entitled "Heed Their Rising Voices," which
stated that "[a]s the whole world knows by now, thousands of Southern
Negro students are engaged in wide-spread non-violent demonstrations
in positive affirmation of the right to live in human dignity as guaranteed
by the U.S. Constitution and the Bill of Rights."48 The article went on to
describe violent opposition to peaceful protests by Martin Luther King,
Jr. and others.49 Sullivan's name was not mentioned, but he alleged that
the article attributed misconduct to him as the Commissioner who was in
charge of supervising the Alabama Police department. 50 The Court ac-
knowledged that although some of the descriptions in the article were not
accurate, requiring absolute truth would inevitably lead to "self-censor-
ship." Thus, it found:
The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule
that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a
defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he
proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice' - that
is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not.
52
The Court concluded that Sullivan did not show actual malice."1
Three years later, in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts54 ("Curtis Pub-
lishing"), the Supreme Court also applied a constitutional privilege to
statements regarding public figures who were not public officials."
Wally Butts, the coach of the University of Georgia's football team,
brought a suit because of a story printed in the Saturday Evening Post
which alleged that he had conspired to "fix" a football game with Bear
46. Id. at 256.
47. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 256.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 256-58.
50. Id at 258.
51. Id. at 279.
52. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
53. Id. at 285-86.
54. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
55. One becomes a public figure by virtue of one's position or by "thrusting [one's] person-
ality into the 'vortex' of an important public controversy." Id. at 155. Public figures attract
sufficient public interest and have "sufficient access to the means of counterargument to be able
'to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies' of the defamatory statements."Id.
(quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
[Vol. I11
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Bryant of the University of Alabama.56 Although Butts was employed
by a private corporation rather than the state, the Court concluded that
he was a public figure." Even though Butts was not considered a public
official, the Court held that the Sullivan test could also apply to public
figures "who are nevertheless intimately involved in the resolution of im-
portant public questions or, by reason of their fame, shape events in areas
of concern to society at large."58 Thus, Butts could only prevail upon "a
showing of highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme depar-
ture from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered
to by responsible publishers. '"59
In 1971 the Supreme Court extended the constitutional privilege in
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia' ° ("Rosenbloom"). Statements regarding
private individuals were privileged when the statements involved matters
of public interest, unless the plaintiff could prove that the media had
actual knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of probable falsity.61
Rosenbloom was arrested during a police raid at a bookstore for obscene
books.62 A radio news reporter reported his arrest, using the terms
"smut literature racket" and "girlie-book peddlers" to describe the ar-
restees.63 After Rosenbloom was acquitted, he sued for libel but he did
not prevail.' Even though Rosenbloom was neither a public official nor
a public figure, the Court held that the Sullivan standard applied because
a media defendant had made the statements and they involved a matter
of public or general interest.65 However, the Court offered no guidance
for determining whether a statement involves a matter of public concern,
purposefully leaving "the delineation of the reach of that term to future
cases."
66
Fifteen years later, the Supreme Court decided Philadelphia News-
papers, Inc. v. Hepps 67 ("Philadelphia Newspapers"), which rendered it
even more difficult for a plaintiff to prevail against a media defendant in a
defamation action. Hepps was the principal stockholder of a corporation
56. Curtis Publishing, 388 U.S. at 135.
57. Id. at 154.
58. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2703 (1990) (quoting Curtis Publish-
ing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring in result)).
59. Curtis Publishing, 388 U.S. 130, 155.
60. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
61. Id. at 31-32.
62. Id. at 32-33.
63. Id. at 34-35.
64. Id. at 36.
65. Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 44, 52.
66. Id. at 44-45.
67. 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
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that franchised a chain of "Thrifty Stores" which sold beer, soft drinks
and snacks.6" Defendant Philadelphia Newspapers published in the Phil-
adelphia Inquirer a series of articles alleging that Hepps, his corporation,
and some of its franchisees were connected to organized crime and used
these connections to influence the government.69 The Court once again
endeavored to determine a just compromise "between the law of defama-
tion and the freedoms of speech and press protected by the [flirst
[a]mendment." 7 From its prior decisions, the Court discerned "two
forces that may reshape the common-law landscape to conform to the
[flirst [a]mendment."'" These two forces were: (1) the distinction be-
tween a plaintiff who was a public official or public figure and the plaintiff
who was a private figure; and (2) whether the speech is of public con-
cern.7 2 If both forces were deemed public, then the Court concluded that
the Constitution provided a much higher barrier to a plaintiff's recovery
than the common law." If neither were public, then the constitutional
directives did not necessarily force any change in the features of the
"common-law landscape."74 The Court stated that "[i]n a case present-
ing a configuration of speech and plaintiff like the one we face here, and
where the scales are in such an uncertain balance, we believe that the
Constitution requires us to tip them in favor of protecting true speech."7 5
Thus, the Court held that "at least where a newspaper publishes a speech
of public concern, a private figure plaintiff cannot recover damages with-
out also showing that the statements at issue are false."7 6
D. Opinion as a Constitutional Privilege
Retreating from the broad coverage of the privilege provided by Ro-
senbloom, the Supreme Court, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. ("Gertz"),7
7
tried to more fairly balance the state's interest in protecting reputation
with the media's competing interest in protection from strict liability.
Gertz involved a policeman in Chicago who shot and killed a boy."8 El-
mer Gertz was an attorney who agreed to represent the decedent's family
68. Id. at 769.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 768.
71. Id. at 775.
72. Philadelphia Newspapers, 475 U.S. at 775.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 776.
76. Id. at 768-69.
77. 418 U.S. 323 (1964).
78. Id. at 325.
[Vol. I11
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in civil litigation against the policeman.79 Robert Welch, Inc. was the
publisher of American Opinion, which was a newsletter espousing the
views of the John Birch Society.8 ° An article published in American
Opinion accused Gertz of being a Communist and part of a nationwide
scheme to discredit local law enforcement agencies and erect a Commu-
nist police force." Even though Gertz was a private individual, the
Court required some finding of fault for recovery, holding that as long as
the states did not exact a strict liability standard, they could define for
themselves the standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of a
defamatory falsehood which injures a private individual.8 2 In finding
that the standard of liability should not be as high for private individuals,
the Court explained:
Public officials and public figures usually enjoy significantly
greater access to the channels of effective communication and
hence have a more realistic opportunity to counteract false
statements than private individuals normally enjoy. Private in-
dividuals are therefore more vulnerable to injury, and the state
interest in protecting them is correspondingly greater.8 "
However, dictum in Gertz became the basis for the states to recognize an
absolute constitutional privilege for opinion:
84
Under the [f]irst [a]mendment there is no such thing as a false
idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for
its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on
the competition of other ideas. But there is no constitutional
value in false statements of fact. 5
The lower courts had difficulty deciding how to apply this distinc-
tion between fact and opinion. 6 Judge Friendly once noted that this
79. Id
80. Id. Beginning in the early 1960's, the newsletter had warned its readers of "a nation-
wide conspiracy to discredit local law enforcement agencies and create in their stead a national
police force capable of supporting a Communist dictatorship."Id.
81. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 326.
82. Id. at 347. The Court also held that for libel plaintiffs to recover presumed or punitive
damages, they must show actual knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of probable falsity.
However, in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 755-56 (1985),
five justices held that these damages were recoverable without such a showing, so long as the
plaintiff is a private individual and the statements do not involve matters of public concern.
83. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344 (footnote omitted).
84. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2705-06 (1990).
85. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339-40 (footnote omitted).
86. Several jurisdictions have held statements privileged by characterizing them as
rhetorical hyperbole that no reasonable reader could construe as actual fact. Other
courts have adopted the standard proposed in the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
Under the Restatement, the court inquires whether the author presented all the facts
on which she based her opinion. If the statement 'does not imply the existence of
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passage "has become the opening salvo in all arguments for protection
from defamation actions on the ground of opinion, even though the case
did not remotely concern the question."87 However, until the Milkovich
holding, lower courts continued to recognize a privilege for opinion.
E. The Latest Chapter: Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.
Although the Supreme Court's libel precedents had never created a
specific protected category for "opinion," most state courts and all of the
federal appellate courts had done so since the Gertz decision in 1974.88
The 1990 Milkovich ruling reversed the cases which were based upon the
premise that opinion is constitutionally privileged, holding that the
threshold inquiry is not whether a defamatory statement "might be la-
beled 'opinion,' " but rather whether a reasonable factfinder could deter-
mine that the statement "impl[ies] an assertion of objective fact."
'8 9
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist asserted that a separate
"opinion" privilege was not necessary since ample protection was pro-
vided to first amendment rights by existing constitutional doctrine.9
undisclosed defamatory facts,' the statement is protected opinion. Still other courts
have adopted a totality of the circumstances test.... In addition to the uncertainties
inherent in each test, the variety of possible tests adds to the confusion.
The Supreme Court, 1989 Term: Leading Cases, 104 HARv. L. REV. 219, 225-26 (1990) (foot-
notes omitted).
The four-part test that the District of Columbia Circuit used to decide Olman v. Evans
750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985) became a widely
used standard. It requires that a court examine "'the common usage or meaning of the alleg-
edly defamatory' statement, whether the statement is verifiable, the 'context in which the state-
ment occurs,' and the broader social context of the statement." The Supreme Court, 1989
Term: Leading Cases; supra, at 226 (quoting Oilman, 750 F.2d at 979-84). See also Note,
supra note 41, at 762 (after examining several lower court holdings, noting that "loin their
face, these contradictory holdings seem odd.... Even more striking, however, each court
asserted that it distinguished fact from opinion by using the influential four-factor test formu-
lated in Olman v. Evans.").
87. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2705 (1990) (quoting Cianci v. New
Times Publishing Co., 639 F.2d 54, 61 (CA 2 1980)). "Read in context, though, the fair
meaning of the passage is to equate the word 'opinion' in the second sentence with the word
'idea' in the first sentence. Under this view, the language was merely a reiteration of Justice
Holmes' classic 'marketplace of ideas' concept." Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2705 (citing Abrams
v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
88. Greenhouse, High Court Narrows Shield in Libel Law, N.Y. Times, Jun. 22, 1990, § A
at 17, col. 4.
89. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2705 (1990).
90. Id. at 2707. Statements regarding matters of public concern must be provable as false
to find a media defendant liable. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 777
(1986). Also, statements that could not reasonably be interpreted as asserting actual facts
about the plaintiff are protected. See e.g., Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Assn., Inc. v.
Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 13 (1970) (defendant's use of the word "blackmail" in his commentary was
not intended to accuse the plaintiff of a criminal offense).
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Milkovich was a high school wrestling coach whose team was in-
volved in an altercation at a wrestling match. 9' There was an investiga-
tory hearing before the Ohio High School Athletic Association
("OHSAA") at which Milkovich and School Superintendent Scott testi-
fied. 92 OHSAA subsequently placed Milkovich's team on probation.93
Milkovich and Scott testified again before a county court which over-
turned OHSAA's ruling.9 The next day The Lorain Journal Company's
newspaper published a column written in the sports section.95 The arti-
cle implied that Milkovich had lied under oath.96 Milkovich sued Lorain
Journal Company and the article's writer for defamation, alleging that
the column constituted libel per se, since it damaged his reputation as a
teacher and a coach by accusing him of committing perjury.97
The trial court granted summary judgment against Milkovich, and
the Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed. 98 The appellate court's judgment
was based in part on the grounds that the article constituted protected
opinion.99 Ohio's Supreme Court dismissed Milkovich's appeal, and the





96. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2698. The column's heading read: "Maple beat the law with
the 'big lie,'" under which were the words "TD Says." The text of the column was as follows:
[A] lesson was learned (or relearned) yesterday by the student body of Maple Heights
High School, and by anyone who attended the Maple-Mentor wrestling meet of last
Feb. 8.
A lesson which, sadly, in view of the events of the past year, is well they learned
early.
It is simply this: If you get in a jam, lie your way out.
If you're successful enough, and powerful enough, and can sound sincere
enough, you stand an excellent chance of making the lie stand up, regardless of what
really happened.
The teachers responsible were mainly Maple wrestling coach, Mike Milkovich,
and former superintendent of schools, H. Donald Scott.
Anyone who attended the meet, whether he be from Maple Heights, Mentor, or
impartial observer, knows in his heart that Milkovich and Scott lied at the hearing
after each having given his solemn oath to tell the truth.
But they got away with it.
Is that the kind of lesson we want our young people learning from their high
school administrators and coaches?
I think not.
Id
97. Id. at 2699-700.
98. Id. at 2701.
99. Id. Superintendent Scott had been pursuing his defamation claim through the Ohio
courts as well. There, the Ohio Supreme Court used the Oilman test from Ollman v. Evans,
750 F.2d 970 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985), to uphold the lower court's entry of
summary judgment. In analyzing the third factor, "the general context of the statement," the
court found that " 'the large caption 'TD says' . . . would indicate to even the most gullible
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United States Supreme Court granted certiorari "to consider the impor-
tant questions raised by the Ohio courts' recognition of a constitution-
ally-required 'opinion' exception to the application of its defamation
laws. ' 0o
The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that there is not necessar-
ily a separate opinion privilege which would prohibit the application of a
state's libel laws."'1 In repudiating a separate privilege for opinion, the
Court explained that the breathing space that freedoms of expression
need to survive "is adequately secured by existing constitutional doctrine
. ... ",102 The Court found an implied assertion of fact in the defendant's
statement (that a high school wrestling coach lied at an athletic associa-
tion hearing) because three conditions were satisfied:
This is not the sort of loose, figurative or hyperbolic language
which would negate the impression that the writer was seri-
ously maintaining petitioner committed the crime of perjury.
Nor does the general tenor of the article negate this impression.
We also think the connotation that petitioner committed
perjury is sufficiently factual to be susceptible of being proved
true or false.'0 a
The Court asserted that its decision balanced the constitutional right to
"free and uninhibited discussion of public issues"' 10 4 against the impor-
tant social values that underlie defamation law and society's "pervasive
reader that the article was, in fact, opinion.'" Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2700 (quoting Scott v.
News-Herald, 25 Ohio St.3d 243, 252, 496 N.E.2d at 707). With respect to the fourth factor,
the "broader context" in which the statement appeared, "the court concluded that, since the
article was in the sports page, " 'a traditional haven for cajoling, invective, and hyperbole,'"
the article would be construed as opinion. Id. at 2701 (quoting Scott, 25 Ohio St.3d at 253-54,
496 N.E.2d at 708).
Therefore, when the instant case came before the Ohio Court of Appeals, it considered
itself bound by the Ohio Supreme Court's holding in Scott that the article was constitutionally
protected opinion and affirmed the lower court's order for summary judgment. Iad
100. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2701.
101. Id. at 2705. One commentator found evidence that Justice Souter will probably agree
with Rehnquist's argument in Milkovich: "In a 1989 New Hampshire case, for example, he
voted to affirm the conviction of a man who placed signs on public property espousing the
unpopular views of a candidate. Judge Souter held that First Amendment rights must give
way to the public's right not to be confronted with offensive views." Garbus, Courting Libel,
251 THE NATION 16, Nov. 2, 1990, at 548.
See also, Wash. Post, Nov. 18, 1990, (Book World) at 15 ("With the subsequent retire-
ment of Justice Brennan [after Milkovich], a firm defender of freedom of the press, the
(C]ourt's tilt in the opposite direction is likely to increase.").
102. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2706 (quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 at
272 (1964)).




and strong interest in preventing and redressing attacks upon
reputation."5'O
IV. THE ROONEY COURT'S REASONING
Milkovich overruled the cases which had supported the district
court's dismissal of Unelko's suit on grounds that Rooney's statement
was protected opinion. t Milkovich rendered the "opinion" test obso-
lete.'" 7 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decided that the record was
fully developed so that the court could apply the Milkovich analysis to
determine whether the statement "It doesn't work" implies an assertion
of fact and whether Unelko met its burden of proof in showing falsity. 08
The court found that Rooney's statements were presented as objective
fact, so his commentary was not privileged."° However, the case was
dismissed on the grounds that Unelko did not show that the comments
were false."
A. Does "It Didn't Work" Imply an Assertion of Fact?
The Ninth Circuit held that under Milkovich, Rooney's statement
was an implied assertion of fact."' The plaintiffs argued:
[Rooney] did not describe [Rain-X's] function or purpose and
did not subjectively identify Rain-X as a 'good' product or a
'bad' product. Rooney did not state that he 'liked' or 'didn't
like' the product. He stated as fact, 'I actually spent an hour
one Saturday putting it on the windshield of my car .... It
105. Id. at 2707 (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966)).
106. See supra text accompanying notes 14-30.
107. Unelko Corp. v. Rooney, 912 F.2d 1049, 1053 (9th Cir. 1990). The court also noted
that the new test does not remove protection from "pure opinion," or statements which do not
imply facts capable of being proved true or false. "Thus, there remains much truth in the old
adage: 'You should not say it is not good. You should say you do not like it, and then, you
know, you're perfectly safe.'" Id. at n.2, (quoting Workman Quote-a-Day Calendar, at June
26, 1990 (quoting James MacNeil Whistler)).
108. Id. at 1053. The circuit court relied upon the rule from Jackson v. Southern Cal. Gas
Co., 881 F.2d 638, 643 (9th Cir. 1989), basing its "ruling on any ground finding support in the
record." Rooney, 912 F.2d at 1053. The court reasoned that "[m]uch of the district court's
analysis is relevant in determining whether 'It didn't work' is a factual statement. The district
court's order discusses Unelko's evidence of falsity at length." Id.
109. Rooney, 912 F.2d at 1055.
110. Id. at 1050. Howard Ohlhausen, the inventor of Rain-X, commented that "[fit ap-
pears, regretfully, that the court did not see fit to review, nor make any attempt to understand,
[the evidence]." 101 Ariz. Republic 102, Aug. 27, 1990, § B at 3. He felt that there was "no
question" that Rooney's stardom influenced the court. Id.
Ill. Rooney, 912 F.2d at 1055. Rooney relied on Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485
U.S. 46, 50 (1988), which held that speech is protected when it could not reasonably be inter-
preted as asserting actual facts about the product. Rooney, 912 F.2d at 1053.
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didn't work.' Rooney even admitted in his deposition that
what he 'meant' by the sentence 'It didn't work' was that the
product 'did not work. It did not do what it said it would do.
My windshield did not look like the picture on this box. It did
not work this way.'12
Defendant CBS disagreed with this aspect of the decision. "It has always
been our belief that these were not statements of fact, but that they were
inherently unreliable comments because they reflect Mr. Rooney's per-
sonal experience with the product.""' 3 The circuit court applied the
Supreme Court's Milkovich test to determine whether Rooney's state-
ment that Rain-X "didn't work" could be viewed as implying an asser-
tion of fact." 4 It analyzed the following factors:
(1) whether Rooney used figurative or hyperbolic language that
would negate the impression that he was seriously maintaining
that Rain-X did not perform effectively; (2) whether the general
tenor of Rooney's segment of '60 Minutes' negated this impres-
sion; and (3) whether the assertion that a product works is sus-
ceptible of being proved true or false. "'
1. Was Rooney's Statement that Rain-X "Didn't Work" Couched in
Figurative or Hyperbolic Language?
The court decided that Rooney's statement was "not couched in
loose, figurative or hyperbolic language."'" 6 To some extent, Rooney's
commentary was characterized by hyperbole with statements such as "I
suppose I could have sued him, but I was busy that day," "This is the
most repulsive thing anyone sent me," and "This is one of the best things
I ever got."' 17 The court acknowledged that "[g]iven the flavor of
Rooney's comments, an audience might anticipate rhetoric or hyperbole,
rather than a factual assessment of Rain-X's capabilities."" 8 However,
112. Appellants' Opening Brief at 8, Rooney, 912 F.2d 1049 (No. CV 89-15751) (quoting
Rooney's deposition). The picture on the box to which Rooney referred depicted the perform-
ance of Rain-X through a windshield, one-half of which was treated with Rain-X and one-half
of which was untreated.
113. Wall Street J., Aug. 30, 1990 at B8, col. I (quoting Helen Gold, in-house counsel for
CBS).
114. Rooney, 912 F.2d at 1053.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1054. The court used the Ninth Circuit test to determine if Rooney's statements
were couched in figurative or hyperbolic language. They "examine[d] the statement in its
totality in the context in which it was uttered or published." Id. (quoting Information Con-





the court denied that this factor weighed in favor of protecting Rooney
from liability because "[i]t produces the impression that Rooney is main-
taining that Rain-X failed to perform as guaranteed, the context of his
broadcast notwithstanding."' 19 Although the flavor of Rooney's com-
mentaries might lead one to expect rhetorical hyperbole instead of a fac-
tual critique of Rain-X, his statement, "It didn't work," gave the
impression that Rooney was asserting that Rain-X failed to perform as
promised. 
1 20
2. Did the Tenor of Rooney's Broadcast Negate the Impression that
He Was Making a Factual Assertion?
The district court decided that because the tenor of Rooney's seg-
ment was humorous and satirical his statement was protected opinion. 12'
However, the Ninth Circuit disagreed, holding that the segment was not
protected due to the overall tenor of his 60 Minutes segment. 22 The
humorous and satirical nature of Rooney's commentary did not negate
the impression that he was asserting as fact that the product was ineffec-
tive when he applied it to his automobiles. '23 The court concluded that a
reasonable person could construe Rooney's statement as implying an as-
sertion of objective fact,' 24 stating:
The humor in Rooney's statement about Rain-X is derived not
from hyperbole or exaggeration, but from the fact that his re-
port of the product's effectiveness was the antithesis of what its
inventor presumably desired. Rooney's negative evaluation of
Rain-X's capabilities differs significantly from his personal as-
sessment of the other items he received in the mail; thus, it re-
ceives no protection based on the overall tenor of his '60
Minutes' segment.
25
3. Is "It Didn't Work" Sufficiently Factual to Be Susceptible of
Being Proved True or False?
The circuit court also found that the statement was sufficiently fac-
tual to be proved true or false, disagreeing with the district court which





124. Rooney, 912 F.2d at 1054. "Although part of a humorous report, the statement 'It
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held that the functions Unelko promised Rain-X would perform de-
pended only upon subjective standards.'26 Although the district court's
reasoning may have been correct under the prior standard for opinions,
the appellate court explained that "whether the facts implied by
Rooney's 'opinion' are susceptible of being proved true or false is a differ-
ent matter."'' 27 The label on the Rain-X bottle reads:
Dramatically improves wet weather visibility - extends &
expands your field of vision - lets you see clearly with and
without wipers! Covers windshields, side and rear windows,
mirrors & lights with an invisible shield that disperses rain,
sleet & snow on contact - shrugs off bugs, frost, salt, mud &
grime, makes cleaning a snap. Whatever the weather, whatever
you drive - use [R]ain-X for increased all-around visibility,
safety, & driving comfort.' 28
Whether Rain-X lives up to each of these promises depends upon "a core
of objective evidence."1 29 Therefore, the statement "It didn't work" was
"an articulation of an objectively verifiable event."' 30
B. Did Unelko Meet Its Burden of Showing Falsity?
Since the statement "It didn't work" was not shielded from liability
under the Milkovich standard, the propriety of the district court's grant
of summary judgment depended upon whether Unelko created a triable
126. Id. at 1054-55. The circuit court recited the lower court's analysis of the subjectivity
of the statement, "It didn't work," as applied to Rain-X:
As an example, whether or not a lightbulb works is an objective determination.
Either it gives off light or it doesn't. Its performance is constant. Consequently
whether it works can be determined solely by one's own sensory perception; there is
no room for differences of opinion. Other products are incapable of such objective
determination. Whether they work depends upon one's subjective evaluation or
opinion, which may be influenced by a multitude of differing factors, conditions, situ-
ations and perspectives. Rain-X is in the latter category as evidenced, in part, by the
letters in the record from consumers expressing both pleasure and displeasure with
the product. Consequently, whether Rain-X works is a subjective determination ca-
pable of producing divergent opinions among those who try it. When Rooney stated
'it didn't work,' he was simply expressing his opinion of the product. As a result, in
this context no defamatory meaning can be attached to Rooney's statement.
Id.
127. Id. at 1055.
128. Id.
129. Rooney, 912 F.2d at 1055 (quoting Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2707).
130. Id. (quoting Scott v. News Herald, 25 Ohio St.3d 243, 252, 496 N.E.2d 699, 707
(1986)). The Rooney court also distinguished the statement "It didn't work" from the satirical
description of "a drunken incestuous rendezvous [between the plaintiff and] his mother in an
outhouse" which was at issue in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 48 (1988). Rooney,
912 F.2d at 1055.
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issue of fact as to the falsity of Rooney's statements.' 3' A factual state-
ment only needs to be substantially true to be protected from a defama-
tion suit. 132 However, the court held that Unelko did not make a
sufficient showing of falsity to avoid a grant of summary judgment.
33
Unelko argued that summary judgment should not have been
granted because Rooney's assertion that he had used Rain-X was false, as
were the facts implied by the statement that Rain-X "didn't work."' 34
The court decided that for purposes of this analysis, Rooney's statement
"It didn't work" implied the factual assertions which he made at his dep-
ositions: that Rain-X "hazed over when the windshield wiper went one
way and tended to smear," that it made his windshield "splotchy," and
that the "windshield did not look like the picture on [the] box."'1
35
Where a private individual sues a media defendant for defamation re-
garding statements of public concern, the Supreme Court has noted that
there is "a constitutional requirement that the plaintiff bear the burden of
showing falsity, as well as fault, before recovering damages. "16
1. Public Concern
To determine whether the statement involved a matter of public
concern, the Supreme Court's decision in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc. 131 ("Dun & Bradstreet") required the Rooney
court to examine the statement's content and the context in which it was
made by looking at the whole record.33 Dun & Bradstreet involved an
action for defamation brought by a construction contractor against a
credit reporting agency which sent false credit reports to the contractor's
creditors. 139 The Supreme Court held that the false statements did not
involve a matter of public concern. "4 The credit report was only sent to
five subscribers who were not to disseminate the information, and the
131. Rooney, 912 F.2d at 1055-56.
132. Id. at 1057.
133. Id. The court explained that Unelko had to "'set forth specific facts showing that
there [was] a genuine issue for trial.'" Id. at 1056 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986)). " '[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of sum-
mary judgment .... against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the
burden of proof at trial.' " Id. at 1057 (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322
(1986)).
134. Id. at 1056.
135. Id.
136. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776 (1986).
137. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
138. Id at 761.
139. Id. at 751.
140. Id. at 762-63.
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subject was only in the interest of the speaker and its specific business
audience.' 4 ' Therefore, the plaintiff did not have to show actual mal-
ice.' The Rooney court distinguished its case from Dun & Bradstreet,
finding that Rooney's statement about Rain-X was of general interest
and was made available to the general public.' 43
In deciding that the Rooney case involved a matter of public concern
the court also relied on Lechuga, Inc. v. Montgomery " ("Lechuga"), an
Arizona products liability case arising from injuries that the plaintiff sus-
tained while using the defendant's truck. In enunciating the underlying
reasons for the strict liability doctrine which would allow the plaintiff to
prevail, the court stated that "it is in the public interest to discourage the
marketing of defective products."' 45 This finding persuaded the court
that Rooney's statement involved a matter of public concern.'" Thus,
the burden of proof was on Unelko to prove falsity' 4 ' since "a statement
on matters of public concern must be provable as false before there can
be liability under state defamation law, at least in situations, like the
present, where a media defendant is involved."' 48
2. Proof of Falsity
Since Rooney's statement involved a matter of public concern, the
court's determination of summary judgment hinged on whether Unelko
made a sufficient showing to the district court that any of Rooney's state-
ments, including his implied factual assertions about Rain-X's perform-
ance, were false.' 49 The court only examined the evidence which Unelko
had offered to challenge Rooney's motion for summary judgment at the
district court level.'" ° This evidence consisted of:
(1) a comparison of a test performed on Rooney's automobile
on June 9, 1988 that revealed no traces of Rain-X and a test
performed on a 'control vehicle' that exhibited traces of Rain-X
after six months of use and exposure; (2) the deposition testi-
mony of Marguerite Rooney, Rooney's wife, which stated that
the windshield Rooney had purportedly just treated with Rain-
141. Id. at 762.
142. Philadelphia Newspapers, 475 U.S. at 772.
143. Rooney, 912 F.2d at 1056.
144. 12 Ariz. App. 32, 467 P.2d 256 (1970).
145. Id. at 37, 467 P.2d at 261.
146. Rooney, 912 F.2d at 1056.
147. Id.
148. Id. (quoting Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2706 (1990)).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1056-57.
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X corresponded in appearance to a picture of a windshield
without Rain-X on the Rain-X box; and (3) Rooney's deposi-
tion testimony, in which he was unable to identify with preci-
sion the amount of time he spent applying Rain-X to his
automobiles or the exact date on which he used the product.' 5 '
The district court's findings persuaded the circuit court that the evi-
dence was inferential and ambiguous and that the summary judgment for
Rooney should be affirmed.' 52 The testimony by Rooney and his wife
showed familiarity with the product and the test evidence failed to show
that the control vehicles in Arizona were maintained under the same
conditions as Rooney's vehicles in Connecticut. 53 The court held that a
reasonable jury could not find that Unelko met its burden of proving
falsity by a preponderance of the evidence.' 54 Unelko did not show that
traces of Rain-X on Rooney's cars would survive a Connecticut winter




A. Misapplication of the Milkovich Standard
The circuit court reviewed the district court's fact versus opinion
distinction and applied the new test of "whether a reasonable factfinder
could conclude that the statement 'impl[ies] an assertion of objective
fact.' "'56 After deciding that Rooney's statement implied assertions of
objective fact, the court undertook a de novo review of "whether Unelko
met its burden of making a showing of falsity."'' 51 In doing so, the court
151. Rooney, 912 F.2d at 1056-57. For instance, in Rooney's first deposition on May 11,
1988, he testified that he applied Rain-X three weeks to a month before he did the April 17
broadcast. However, after Unelko's June 9 inspection of Rooney's cars, which found no traces
of Rain-X, Rooney testified at his deposition on August 10 that "it could have been as early as
December." Appellants' Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En banc at 6,
Rooney, 912 F.2d 1049 (No. CA 89-15751) (quoting Rooney's deposition).
152. Rooney, 912 F.2d at 1057.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. Ambiguity does not defeat a motion for summary judgment. "[T]he burden of
proof is the deciding factor.., when the evidence is ambiguous .... [Wlhere the scales are in
such an uncertain balance, we believe that the Constitution requires us to tip them in favor of
protecting true speech." Id. (quoting Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767,
776 (1986)).
The court also upheld the dismissal of Unelko's claims for product disparagement (trade
libel) and tortious interference with business relationships, since they were subject to the same
first amendment requirements as those for a defamation action. Id. at 1057-58.
156. Id. at 1053 (quoting Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2705 (1990)).
157. Rooney, 912 F.2d at 1053.
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failed to allow Unelko to demonstrate the falsity of the objective facts
implied by Rooney's statement. 158
1. The Circuit Court Should Have Remanded the Case
to the Trial Court
The circuit court regarded the record as complete. The court went
on to apply different legal standards and burdens of proof. As a result,
Unelko had no opportunity to address or brief these issues.'
59
The court decided that the record was "fully developed"' 1" and said
it could base its ruling "on any ground finding support in the record.' 6'
Unelko argued that the record had not been fully developed.' 62 During
the lower court proceedings, Unelko was mid-stream in discovery when
the motion for summary judgment was filed.' 63 The issue at hand was
whether the statements were fact or opinion. Consequently, Unelko was
not given the opportunity to prove its case according to the new
standard.
Unelko argued that it was constitutionally entitled to present its case
and to develop a factual record in light of the court's introduction of
controlling law.' The Ninth Circuit has previously held that the dis-
158. Appellants' Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En banc at 1,
Rooney, 912 F.2d 1049 (No. CA 89-15751). Robert Cummins, a Chicago attorney who repre-
sented Unelko, said that while the appellate court judges were correct in finding Andy
Rooney's comments potentially defamatory, the court's analysis of whether his comments
were true or false "missed the mark." Cummins asserted that they "did not have an opportu-
nity to develop a record that could be objectively scrutinized." Wall Street J., Aug. 30, 1990,
at B8, col. 1.
159. Appellants' Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En banc at 1,
Rooney, 912 F.2d 1049 (No. CA 89-15751). The issue confronted by Unelko in responding to
Rooney's motion for summary judgment was whether his statements were fact or opinion
according to the then controlling law. Id at 8-9. When the Supreme Court reverses the au-
thority upon which a district court relies, "'the underpinnings of the district court's decision
have been shaken' " and the circuit court should remand the proceedings and permit the par-
ties to fully develop the factual record. Id at 8 (quoting Swistock v. Jones, 884 F.2d 755, 758
(3d Cir. 1989)).
160. Rooney, 912 F.2d at 1053.
161. Id. (quoting Jackson v. Southern California Gas Co., 881 F.2d 638, 643 (9th Cir.
1989)).
162. Appellants' Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En banc at 3,
Rooney, 912 F.2d 1049 (No. CA 89-15751).
163. Id. at 8-9. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (holding that a court
should mandate the entry of summary judgment only if there has been adequate time for
discovery).
164. Appellants' Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En banc at 8,
Rooney, 912 F.2d 1049 (No. CA 89-15751). The seventh amendment of the United States
Constitution provides:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall
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trict court should determine whether new evidence is material under a
revised legal standard. 65 Consequently, the circuit court should have
remanded the proceedings and permitted the parties to fully develop a
factual record.
166
2. The Court Failed to Analyze the Assertions Implied
by Rooney's Statement
Unelko also argued that this incomplete record was erroneously ap-
plied in light of Milkovich. Rather than following the holding in
Milkovich and examining the falsity of Rooney's statement on the basis
of objective fact, the court limited its analysis of falsity to what Rooney
subjectively stated or meant to say. This contradicted the standard that
the court recognized was present in Milkovich. The circuit court failed to
examine whether Unelko demonstrated, or even had the opportunity to
demonstrate, any of the false objective facts implied by Rooney's state-
ments. 67 The court should have examined what a reasonable person
would understand Rooney's statement to mean.
16
There were eight factual assertions implied by Rooney's com-
mentary:
(1) the 'fellow' who makes this sent him the product in care of
CBS or '60 Minutes'; (2) for the purpose of receiving a televi-
sion 'commercial' or 'testimonial'; (3) Rooney spent an hour
applying Rain-X; (4) to the windshield of one car; (5) he ap-
plied it correctly; (6) even though he went through all that ef-
be otherwise re-examined in any court of the United States, then according to the
rules of the common law.
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
165. United States v. Walgren, 885 F.2d 1417, 1428 (9th Cir. 1989).
166. See Swistock v. Jones, 884 F.2d 755, 758 (3d Cir. 1989). The Arizona Supreme Court
has stated:
It is one thing to engage in a constitutionally mandated, independent review of the
evidence to see if it supports a verdict which otherwise will stand; it is a different
thing, having reversed the verdict for error of law, to determine whether the evidence
is sufficient to permit the case to go to trial at all. While the difference may be subtle,
the seventh amendment right to a jury trial in federal cases is implicated.
Appellants' Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En banc at 9, Rooney, 912
F.2d 1049 (No. CA 89-15751) (quoting Dombey v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 150 Ariz. 476,
486 n.5, 724 P.2d 562, 572 n.5 (1986)).
167. Appellants' Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En banc at 3,
Rooney, 912 F.2d 1049 (No. CA 89-15751).
168. Id. "Precluding a plaintiff from recovering for defamation that is cleverly couched in
implication is inequitable. It rewards a defendant for having the foresight or literary facility to
secrete a 'classic and coolly crafted libel' in the overtones of a facially neutral statement."
Note, The Art of Insinuation: Defamation by Implication, 58 FORDHAM L. REv. 677, 701
(1990) (quoting Olman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985)).
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fort, it didn't work, and therefore (7) Rain-X is 'junk,' and (8)
the manufacturer is dishonest for representing otherwise. 69
Unelko presented evidence that each of these assertions were false
and misleading.' First, the Rain-X was sent to Andy Rooney in care of
the Chicago Tribune for his personal use in response to his article about
rain.1 7 1 It was not sent for a commercial endorsement. 172 Second,
Rooney confessed that he did not spend the entire hour applying Rain-X
to the windshield on his car and he contradicted his own testimony re-
garding the cars he allegedly treated. 73 Instead of examining the mean-
ing which reasonable viewers could glean from Rooney's statement, the
court substituted Rooney's own subjective interpretation:
For the purposes of analyzing Unelko's showing of falsity, we
assume that Rooney's statement 'It didn't work' implied the
following factual assertions about Rain-X's performance, which
Rooney made at his deposition - that it 'hazed over when the
windshield wiper went one way and tended to smear,' that it
caused his windshield to be 'splotchy,' and that the 'windshield
did not look like the picture on [the] box.
' 74
However, the average viewer would not be aware of Rooney's depo-
sition testimony. Under the Milkovich rule, the statement's implications
would not be so limited. The court failed to address the underlying facts
when it affirmed Rooney's motion for summary judgment.
B. Inappropriate Analysis Regarding the Issue of Public Concern
Even if the statements at issue are susceptible of being proven true
or false, the Milkovich Court noted that for statements of public concern
the plaintiff has the burden of proving their falsity before a state's libel
laws can be applied.' 75 The Court relied on Philadelphia Newspapers,
which held "that the common-law presumption that defamatory speech
is false cannot stand when a plaintiff seeks damages against a media de-
169. Appellants' Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En banc at 5,
Rooney, 912 F.2d 1049 (No. CA 89-15751).
170. Id. at 5-8.
171. Id. at 5.
172. Id.
173. Id at 5-6. At Rooney's first deposition, he said that he spent an hour washing his
BMW and his wife's Saab, and then applied Rain-X to all the windows of both cars. Then he
changed his testimony and testified that the Rain-X was applied to all of the windows of a
BMW and a Ford, but not to his wife's Saab. Rooney further impeached his testimony con-
cerning the issue of when he allegedly applied Rain-X. Id.
174. Rooney, 912 F.2d at 1056.
175. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2707 (1990).
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fendant for speech of public concern " 76 Absent a finding of public con-
cern, the burden of proving falsity imposed by Philadelphia Newspapers
would not apply.'77 Therefore, Unelko would prevail under the
Milkovich test for a constitutional privilege, which would override the
state's interest in protecting private plaintiffs from defamatory state-
ments. Arizona's libel laws would now control since "so long as they do
not impose liability without fault, the [s]tates may define for themselves
the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of de-
famatory falsehood injurious to a private individual."17 Under Arizona
law, Unelko would only have had to show that Andy Rooney and CBS
were negligent by a preponderance of the evidence. 7 9 It appears that
under this standard, Unelko had sufficient evidence to withstand
Rooney's motion for summary judgment. Therefore, this unitary finding
by the circuit court of public concern was clearly detrimental to the
plaintiff.
The Ninth Circuit concluded that Rooney's statements involved a
matter of public concern but Unelko was not allowed to brief and de-
velop a record with respect to the issue of public concern.8 o The Ninth
Circuit erroneously addressed this issue because it was not previously
addressed by the District Court.18 1 The court focused on Rooney rather
than the subject matter.
8 2
The case upon which the Ninth Circuit relied in determining that
176. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 777 (1986) (emphasis added).
177. The Rooney court referred to Unelko as a "private individual." Rooney, 912 F.2d at
1056.
178. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974).
179. Peagler v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 114 Ariz. 309, 315, 560 P.2d 1216, 1222 (1977).
The Peagler court held that the Arizona standard for defamation of a private person was
negligence, stating that "[t]he question which the jury must determine from the preponderance
of the evidence is whether the defendants acted reasonably in attempting to discover the truth
or falsity of the defamatory character of the publication."Id. (citations omitted).
180. Appellants' Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En banc at 12,
Rooney, 912 F.2d 1049 (No. CA 89-15751). This is not an easily answered issue, because the
Supreme Court has not enunciated a bright-line test for characterizing matters of public con-
cern as opposed to private matters. "Instead, the court has loosely defined speech concerning
public matters as 'relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the commu-
nity,' ...." Note, Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps Revisited: A Critical Approach to Differ-
ent Standards of Protection for Media and Nonmedia Defendants in Private Plaintiff
Defamation Cases, 58 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1268, 1275 (1990) (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461
U.S. 138, 146 (1983)).
181. When the Supreme Court reverses the authority upon which the district court relied,
"the underpinnings of the district court's decision is shaken" and the circuit court should
remand the proceedings and permit the parties to fully develop the factual record. Swistock v.
Jones, 884 F.2d 755, 758 (3d Cir. 1989).
182. Appellants' Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En banc at 14 n.20,
Rooney, 912 F.2d 1049 (No. CA 89-15751).
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the matter was one of public concern was not applicable because the case
did not involve the first amendment. 8 3 Instead of being premised on
federal constitutional principle, the action was based on state tort law.
To support its finding, the Ninth Circuit seized upon the assertion in
Lechuga that "[i]t is in the public interest to place responsibility for in-
jury upon the manufacturer who was responsible for its reaching the
market."'8 4 The concurring opinion in Lechuga used this assertion in
the context of placing responsibility upon the manufacturer of a defective
product for compensating consumers who are injured."8 ' Public interest
in the context of product liability is a completely different issue than the
issue of public concern for purposes of protection of a product manufac-
turer like Unelko who is defamed by the media without basis.
VI. SIGNIFICANCE AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE CASE
Libel law attempts to balance two competing policies important in
our society. On the one hand, there is the first amendment guarantee of
freedom of speech.'8 6 Public discourse is valued for its dissemination of
ideas and information. Public debate aids the discovery of truth and en-
ables all citizens to participate in decision-making, while free expression
helps to assure self-fulfillment."8 7 On the other hand, there is a personal
interest in protecting one's reputation by providing redress for harm and
vindication of reputation." 8 The Supreme Court has recognized "impor-
tant social values which underlie the law of defamation," and that
"[s]ociety has a pervasive and strong interest in preventing and re-
dressing attacks upon reputation."18 9 As Justice Stewart asserted in Ro-
183. Lechuga, Inc. v. Montgomery, 12 Ariz. App. 32, 33, 467 P.2d 255, 257 (1970).
Lechuga did not address a first amendment issue. Rather, the issue was whether strict liability
should be applied in a tort action involving an allegedly defective product. Id.
184. Id. at 37, 467 P.2d at 261 (Jacobson, J., concurring).
185. Id.
186. "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press .. .
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
187. Note, supra note 41, at 787-88.
188. "In Shakespeare's Othello, lago says to Othello:
'Good name in man and woman, dear my lord.
Is the immediate jewel of their souls.
Who steals my purse steals trash;
'Tis something, nothing;
'Twas mine, 'tis his, and has been slave to thousands;
But he that filches from me my good name
Robs me of that which not enriches him,
And makes me poor indeed.' Act III, scene 3."
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2702 (9th Cir. 1990).
189. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2707-08 (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966)).
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senblatt v. Baer: "
The right of a man to the protection of his own reputation
from unjustified invasion and wrongful hurt reflects no more
than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of
every human being - a concept at the root of any decent sys-
tem of ordered liberty.
... The destruction that defamatory falsehood can bring
is, to be sure, often beyond the capacity of the law to redeem.
Yet imperfect though it is, an action for damages is the only
hope for vindication or redress the law gives to a man whose
reputation has been falsely dishonored. 9'
Rulings with certainty and clarity are of utmost importance in the area of
free speech to ensure not only that plaintiffs obtain redress, but also so
that the media is protected from the chilling effect of an elusive stan-
dard.' 92 Society's interest in an open forum for debate of issues is neither
served by careless mistakes nor by lies.' 93
After the Gertz fact versus opinion distinction, considerable contro-
versy arose as to what statements were actionable."' Many argued that
private citizens would be stripped of all redress since it was relatively
simple to persuade the courts that a statement was merely opinion. Chief
Justice Rehnquist noted that "[1]ower courts have seized upon the word
'opinion' [in Gertz] ... to solve with a meat axe a very subtle and difficult
question, totally oblivious 'of the rich and complex history of the struggle
of the common law to deal with this problem.' "195
190. 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
191. Id. at 92-93 (Stewart, J. concurring). An attorney who represented a Miss Wyoming in
a defamation suit against Penthouse lamented the difficulty in vindicating one's reputation in
the current courts:
Many years ago when I went to law school there was a simple axiom that shed hope
on that otherwise dreary experience: 'Where there is a wrong, there is a remedy.'
But that was before the great shifting of values had so tilted the country that we all
slid down that slithery slope into the great green abyss where money and profit are
everything and God is Mammon. Those were the 'olden days' when the rights of
people came first and when juries, not distant judges fluttering on celestial thrones,
decided our cases.
Spence, The Sale of the First Amendment, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1989, at 52.
192. "Uncertainty as to the scope of the constitutional protection can only dissuade pro-
tected speech - the more elusive the standard, the less protection it affords." Harte-Hanks
Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 109 S. Ct. 2678, 2695 (1989).
193. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-340 (1974).
194. See supra text accompanying notes 77-87.
195. Olman v. Evans, 471 U.S. 1127, 1129 (1985) (dissenting from denial of petition for
writ of certiorari) (quoting Hill, Defamation and Privacy Under the First Amendment, 76
COLUM. L. REV. 1205, 1239 (1986)).
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Now that the Supreme Court has attempted to resolve this problem,
the remedy's effect will be determined by its application by the lower
courts.'9 6 As the first circuit court to interpret the new Milkovich rule,
the Ninth Circuit has defeated the rule's purpose by applying it in an
arbitrary way. Thus, the rule may follow the path of the old opinion
privilege, with the courts deciding cases which serve "merely [as] 'com-
passes,' not 'maps,' adding little predictability to the privilege." 197
VII. CONCLUSION
Because the fact versus opinion distinction was so hazy, the
Supreme Court sought to clarify defamation rulings through its
Milkovich decision.' 9 The lower courts had been defining the distinction
in many different ways.' 99 In Rooney, instead of taking advantage of the
Supreme Court's clarification, the Ninth Circuit obtained the decision it
wanted via an arbitrary application of the rule.2" The court ruled in
favor of Rooney, a media defendant, seemingly protecting first amend-
ment rights and encouraging wide open debate. In reality, this ruling
will inhibit public discourse because arbitrary application of rules pro-
motes uncertainty. If members of the media are uncertain whether or
not their statements are actionable, they will tend to inhibit their speech
- the proverbial "chilling effect." This is an unfortunate first interpreta-
tion of a landmark decision in libel law.
Kimberly Adams Dietsche *
196. Milkovich clearly seems designed to bring about a sea of change in the way lower
courts analyze opinion issues. But it remains to be seen what its real impact will be.
As torts such as defamation, disparagement and injurious falsehood are crea-
tures of state law, Milkovich's importance will depend in large part upon its reception
in state appellate courts.
Clayton, High Court: No Federal Privilege for Opinion, THE NAT'L L. J., Aug. 27, 1990, at 27.
197. Note, The Illusion of the Fact-Opinion Distinction in Defamation Law, 39 CASE W.
REs. L. REV. 867, 893 (1989) (footnote omitted).
198. See Note, supra note 168, at 690 (The Supreme Court agreed to hear Milkovich be-
cause it recognized that the lower court tests for distinguishing fact from opinion "spawn[ed]
inconsistency.").
199. See supra text accompanying notes 77-87.
200. "Some commentators [before the Milkovich decision] suggest[ed] juries in libel cases
may really be trying the popularity of the statement at issue. However, similar problems can
arise with judges." Note, supra note 197, at 894 (footnote omitted).
* The author wishes to thank Rusty Dietsche and Jeff Grant for their help with this
article.
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